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Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1
expanded considerably during 2005 and early 2006 in both
avian host species and geographic distribution. Domestic
waterfowl and migratory birds are reservoirs, but lethality of
this subtype appeared to initially limit migrant effectiveness
as introductory hosts. This situation may have changed, as
HPAI H5N1 has recently expanded across Eurasia and into
Europe and Africa. Birds could introduce HPAI H5N1 to the
Western Hemisphere through migration, vagrancy, and
importation by people. Vagrants and migratory birds are
not likely interhemispheric introductory hosts; import of
infected domestic or pet birds is more probable. If reassort-
ment or mutation were to produce a virus adapted for rapid
transmission among humans, birds would be unlikely intro-
ductory hosts because of differences in viral transmission
mechanisms among major host groups (i.e., gastrointesti-
nal for birds, respiratory for humans). Another possible
result of reassortment would be a less lethal form of avian
influenza, more readily spread by birds. 
A
vian influenza virus Arefers collectively to a group of
viruses within the family Orthomyxoviridae that has a
worldwide distribution and causes a variety of diseases in
birds. Classification of influenza viruses is based on 2 gly-
coproteins (antigens) characteristic of the group members:
hemagglutinin, of which 16 forms are known; and neu-
raminidase, of which 9 forms have been described. In
1997, a virulent, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
A virus, identified as the H5N1 subtype, was identified in
samples taken in Hong Kong (1,2). This virus has spread
to several localities in Asia and, since late 2005, Europe (3)
and Africa (4) (Table 1). HPAI H5N1 virus is found most
commonly in domestic fowl, although as of late 2005, it
has been found in migratory and resident birds of several
orders (mainly Anseriformes) and in pigs, civets, house
cats, tigers, leopards, and humans (3). This virus poses a
potential danger to human populations; 224 human cases
of H5N1 avian influenza have been reported as of May 29,
2006; 127 of these cases were fatal (17). Its discovery in
migratory birds is especially troubling because of the
potential for rapid dispersal of the virus across continents
and hemispheres.
We review facts concerning outbreaks of H5N1; the
species of birds, especially migrants, known to have been
infected by this subtype; and available information on the
ability of migrants to serve as reservoir or introductory
hosts that move the virus from outbreak areas to new local-
ities. On the basis of this information, we consider the
avian pathways by which HPAI H5N1 might enter the
Western Hemisphere and, once present, the likelihood that
it will be able to disperse to new regions. We define migra-
tory or migrant birds as those species that move annually
between geographically separate breeding and wintering
quarters. Migrating birds are those actually in the process
of moving from 1 locality to another.
Ecology of Influenza A Viruses
Avian influenza A viruses are common and widespread
in birds. Most viruses in this family attack the intestinal
tract of the host preferentially and are spread mainly by
shedding in host feces (18,19). Waterfowl, e.g., ducks,
geese, and swans (Anseriformes), and shorebirds
(Charadriiformes) are particularly susceptible because
they are exposed to water that may be contaminated with
infected fecal matter, especially at specific sites and sea-
sons, when these birds congregate densely at relatively
confined and shallow water bodies (Figure 1). Asecondary
mode of viral spread is consumption of infected avian host
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Sciences, Valtice, Czech Republic parts by predators, including captive carnivores, avian rap-
tors, and carrion-feeding vertebrates. Infection by most
avian influenza A strains appears to be asymptomatic for
the host (18). Proportions of birds shedding active virus
can be high (e.g., >30% in some Canadian duck popula-
tions) among juvenile waterfowl gathered in large flocks
on lakes and ponds during the summer postbreeding molt-
ing period but decrease rapidly during southward migra-
tion, falling to 1% to 2% during winter (18). Nevertheless,
shedding of active virus can remain as high as 0.25% by
individual birds among northbound spring migrants, suffi-
cient to reinfect northern breeding populations (18).
Most birds appear to be more or less susceptible to >1
strain of avian influenza A, but rates of infection and lev-
els of susceptibility to the different viral subtypes vary
among taxa. For instance, H3 and H6 subtypes are com-
mon in ducks, geese, and swans (Anseriformes), while H4,
H9, H11, and H13 subtypes are more prevalent in sand-
pipers, terns, and gulls (Charadriiformes) (20). The best
opportunities for viral transmission among large numbers
of anseriform hosts would likely be on lakes and ponds in
summer, where large concentrations gather for weeks to
undergo the postbreeding, premigratory molt (18). For
charadriiformes, the greatest viral transmission opportuni-
ties would likely be at stopover sites during fall migration,
where tens of thousands of individual birds congregate to
feed and roost (20).
Avian Influenza in Humans
Humans and other mammals normally are not suscepti-
ble to infection by avian influenza Aviruses. Nevertheless,
several subtypes of avian influenza or bird-origin influen-
za viruses have infected humans; 3 of these subtypes have
caused pandemics within the past century. At present,
HPAI H5N1 is entirely an avian influenza subtype.
Humans can become infected, but so far as is known, they
must inhale or ingest massive viral doses from excreta or
tissues of infected birds to do so. Although clinically ill
humans have high death rates, ≈50%, passage of H5N1
virus from human to human is rare (3).
The more humans infected with HPAI H5N1, the
greater the probability that reassortment with a human
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that is spread readily between humans (18,19). However,
viral interhost transmission strategies differ fundamentally
for those viruses that primarily infect humans versus those
that infect birds. Bird viruses have an affinity for the host’s
intestinal tract, and interhost transmission occurs mainly
by fecal contamination of shared water bodies. Human
viruses more often attack the respiratory system and
depend on shedding in respiratory effluvia for interhost
transfer. If, or when, a reassortment or mutation of HPAI
H5N1 produces a virus capable of efficient horizontal
transfer among humans, the new virus would likely not be
particularly effective in transfer among birds; migrants
likely would play little role in spread of such a virus.
Vaccines produced to prevent human infection by H5N1
might not be effective against a new virus produced by
reassortment.
Birds as HPAI H5N1 Reservoirs 
and Introductory Hosts in the Old World
The main reservoirs and introductory hosts for avian
influenza A viruses in general are migratory waterfowl and
domestic fowl (18,19). HPAI H5N1, however, causes high
rates of disabling illness and death in most avian species
(21). High rates of illness would prevent migrants from
being introductory hosts, since sick wild birds normally
cannot move far and do not survive long. Thus, perhaps not
surprisingly, no evidence exists that migrants were intro-
ductory hosts for H5N1 for several years after its initial
appearance in Guangdong Province, People’s Republic of
China, in 1996. In fact, no deaths or even infections of
migrants were reported until December 2002, when sever-
al migrants and exotic birds were found dead at a Hong
Kong park and zoologic garden (10). Of 3,095 outbreaks of
HPAI H5N1 reported from December 2003 through
February 2005, all involved captive birds or domestic fowl
(6). Until early August 2005, only 2 outbreaks of HPAI
H5N1 had been confirmed in migratory birds presumed to
be completely separate from domestic fowl: Qinghai Lake
and Xinjiang Province, China, (April, May 2005) (12) and
Lakes Erhel and Khunt in northern Mongolia (August
2005) (15). However, that situation has changed, and sever-
al new outbreaks have been recorded in migrants that were
presumably separate from domestic fowl within the last few
months (online Appendix; available from http://www.cdc.
gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no10/05-1577_app.htm), perhaps
signaling genetic modification of the virus (19). 
Data based on observations of dead wild birds at sites
where infections have broken out and negative results from
subsequent extensive screening for seropositive or infected
migrants around outbreak sites have indicated that HPAI
H5N1 was lethal for most wild birds, at least until recently.
Nevertheless, some studies have demonstrated that chick-
ens, domestic ducks, and geese infected under laboratory
conditions, as well as some wild birds exposed under qua-
silaboratory conditions (e.g., birds fed, watered, and pro-
tected at zoologic parks or gardens), survive infection and
shed the virus in active form (10,22,23). The work by
Komar et al. (24) on wild birds exposed to West Nile virus
(WNV) under laboratory conditions may be instructive in
this regard. These researchers found that in species like the
fish crow (Corvus ossifragus), in which individual birds
were known to have high death rates on exposure to the
New York 99 subtype of WNV in the wild (on the basis of
large numbers of birds found dead and failure to find free-
flying birds captured that were seropositive), survival rates
from exposure in the laboratory were 45%. When one con-
siders that birds kept in a laboratory have ready access to
food and water during their illness, as well as protection
from inclement weather and predators, this finding perhaps
is not surprising. However, wild birds associating with free-
ranging domestic fowl at farm ponds, or captive exotic
birds at city parks or zoological gardens, may receive some
of the same benefits as laboratory birds, experiencing con-
ditions conducive to survival of infection by HPAI H5N1.
Recent detections of HPAI H5N1 in free-ranging
migrants may be a result of heightened awareness and thus
the virus could have been circulating in migrants, although
undetected. This explanation is unlikely considering the
extensive screening of blood and feces of migrants in the
past several years in Europe, parts of Asia, and North
America. These screenings have searched for birds
seropositive for H5N1 and other avian influenza type A
viruses. These searches have involved sampling thousands
of birds of hundreds of species (25,26). The virus may also
have changed to some degree (2,19), allowing higher sur-
vival rates among some species of migrants. Both explana-
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Figure 1. Saurus cranes (Grus antigone) over Naung Mung,
Myanmar, in March 2006.tions may have some relevance to the current situation. In
any event, some migratory birds may now be able to move
HPAI H5N1 in active form over considerable distances
(online Appendix). Increasing numbers of recent reports
document apparent movement of the virus, whereas before
April 2005, no evidence existed of HPAI H5N1 in free-
ranging migratory birds distant from domestic fowl,
despite years of sampling of tens of thousands of migrato-
ry waterfowl of several species from wetland sites across
the European continent (25).
Possible Role of Birds in Arrival 
of HPAI H5N1 Avian Influenza in New World
To date, HPAI H5N1 has not been recorded in the New
World, although outbreaks of related avian influenza virus-
es lethal to domestic fowl have occurred in Ontario,
Canada, in 1966 (H5N9); Pennsylvania, United States in
1983 (H5N2); Puebla, Mexico, in 1994 (H5N2); Chile in
2002 (H7N3); Canada in 2004 (H7N3); and Texas, United
States, in 2004 (H5N2) (27). All of these outbreaks
occurred in domestic poultry and were controlled without
further diffusion. We see 3 possible modes by which HPAI
H5N1 might gain entry to the New World if birds were the
introductory host: 1) normal interhemispheric migration,
2) vagrancy, and 3) legal and illegal importation of birds as
explained in the following section.
Normal Interhemispheric Migration
Few individual birds within few species undertake reg-
ular, interhemispheric migration. However, some do, and
the waterfowl (Anseriformes, Charadriiformes, Ciconii-
formes) could be introductory hosts for HPAI H5N1 to the
New World (Table 2). Three pathways are used annually
by a small number of waterfowl species to travel between
the hemispheres: 1) Alaska–East Asia, in which birds that
breed in Alaska winter in East Asia; 2) East Asia–Pacific
North America, in which birds that breed in northeast Asia
winter along the Pacific Coast of North America; and 3)
Europe–Atlantic North America, in which birds that breed
in Iceland or northwestern Europe winter along the
Atlantic Coast of North America (Figure 2, Table 2).
Two lines of evidence argue against normal, interhemi-
spheric migration as a likely mode of entry for HPAI H5N1
into the Western Hemisphere. First, as discussed previous-
ly, data indicate that most infected individual birds of most
species of migrants become extremely ill and either cannot
migrate far in their weakened state or die at the place of
infection. Second, investigation of the genetics of avian
influenza viruses has shown that little natural interchange
occurs between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres:
each hemisphere appears to have an avian influenza virus
community that is largely distinct (18). This fact is partic-
ularly noteworthy when one considers that most avian
influenza A viruses appear to be asymptomatic, and
migrants readily transport them in infectious form, in stark
contrast to the situation for HPAI H5N1. Presumably, the
distinct nature of the avian influenza Acommunity in each
hemisphere results from the fact that the main reservoir for
these viruses is migrants, and few migrants move regular-
ly between the hemispheres (32).
Vagrancy
Perhaps a third or more of Eurasian waterfowl species
have traveled into the Western Hemisphere as vagrants;
some occur more regularly than others, including those list-
ed in Table 2. However, all Eurasian vagrants are, by defi-
nition, extremely rare in the New World (a few birds per
decade). One mode of interhemispheric vagrancy is tropical
storm systems that originate off the West African coast dur-
ing the Atlantic hurricane season, which lasts from June to
November each year. These systems can, and occasionally
do, sweep up and transport Old World birds, especially
waterfowl, across the Atlantic to the New World (route 4,
Figure 2). Vagrancy is much rarer (by several orders of
magnitude) than normal interhemispheric migration and
seems an even less likely mode of entry for HPAI H5N1.
Legal and Illegal Importations
Human traffic in birds and bird products is the sole doc-
umented means of HPAI H5N1 movement between geo-
graphically separate regions to date (19). While migratory
birds have been suspected of involvement, particularly in
cases in which no obvious human interchange of infected
birds or products has occurred, these conclusions are
inferred (19). Thus, if HPAI H5N1 is to be kept out of the
Western Hemisphere, control of legal and illegal imports
should be the primary focus of prevention efforts.
The legal importation of exotic birds has declined dra-
matically in the United States since enactment of the 1992
Wild Bird Conservation Act. Nevertheless, 2,770 birds
entered the country through the New York port of entry in
1999, including 323 pet birds and 2,447 commercial birds.
In addition, 12,931 birds passed through in transit (S.
Kaman, US Department of Agriculture [USDA], pers.
comm.) Legal importations are controlled by USDA
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the US
Fish and Wildlife Service. Most imported birds undergo a
30-day quarantine at USDA facilities located near each of
the 3 allowed ports of entry: New York, Miami, and Los
Angeles. Quarantine procedures include isolation in
indoor, air-filtered cages and standard testing for common
poultry diseases, including avian influenza. The number
of illegally imported birds is not known. These birds are
not subject to quarantine and testing and could be a mode
of entry for HPAI H5N1. Hawk eagles from Thailand
infected with the virus were recently detected while being
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detected and quarantined, they serve as an example of
how such imports could spread the virus. Species com-
monly associated with the transhemispheric bird trade are
listed in Table 2.
If birds turn out to be responsible for entry of HPAI
H5N1 into the Western Hemisphere, illegal import of an
infected bird or bird product seems the most likely mode
of entry. We base this conclusion on the fact that illegally
imported birds, unlike infected, free-flying migrants, are
provided food and water ad libitum and protected from
predators, greatly increasing their chances of survival in an
infectious state. Furthermore, these birds often end up in
close association with other, similarly protected birds,
PERSPECTIVE
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ample opportunity for viral transmission.
Possible Role of Birds in Movement 
of HPAI H5N1 in Western Hemisphere
Movement of HPAI H5N1 by sale of infected domestic
fowl or poultry products in the United States and Canada
is unlikely, given existing regulations. Thus, a major mode
of HPAI spread available in much of Eurasia would be
ruled out. Also, most domestic fowl are kept separate from
wild migratory waterfowl in both countries, which would
rule out a second major mode of introduction and cross-
infection. Mixing of wild migratory birds with captive,
exotic birds is relatively common, however, at North
American zoos. Birds in such exhibits should be screened
regularly for H5N1 or whatever HPAI virus is in circula-
tion during a given year.
The HPAI H5N1 subtype of avian influenza A causes
high mortality rates in most wild birds, at least in its pres-
ent form. The situation is similar to that found for the form
of WNV introduced into the Western Hemisphere in 1999
(24,32–34). Even under conditions in which food, water,
and protection from predators are provided, death rates are
high. These kinds of death rates could result if the current
form of HPAI H5N1 were introduced into New World bird
populations. In such a scenario, migrants might not be
capable of moving the virus far from its point of introduc-
tion, at least initially. Also, the die-offs occurring at the site
of entry likely would be obvious to wildlife disease moni-
tors, which would allow for rapid quarantine. However, if
the H5N1 virus were introduced into the Western
Hemisphere, migratory birds, particularly anseriforms
(ducks, swans, geese), might serve as dispersal agents,
especially if the virus were to change to a less lethal form
through reassortment or mutation.
A key difference between mosquitoborne WNV and
birdborne HPAI H5N1 is the virtual absence of effective
reservoir hosts other than birds for the latter. WNV can be
maintained without birds because infected mosquitoes can
pass active virus to subsequent generations through verti-
cal transmission (35). So far as is known, no alternative to
birds exists as major reservoir hosts for HPAI H5N1.
An additional consideration concerning the future of
HPAI H5N1, should it gain wide circulation in migratory
birds, is the possibility of infection of a bird already infect-
ed with another form of avian influenza virus. Such infec-
tion could result in reassortment and production of a new
virus, possibly less lethal than HPAI H5N1 but more read-
ily spread.
Conclusions
HPAI H5N1 spread rapidly across Eurasia during 2005
for reasons that are not entirely understood. Despite this
rapid movement, effective introduction (i.e., under condi-
tions allowing its spread) of the virus to the New World
through migratory or vagrant birds seems unlikely. Few
individual members of few waterfowl species migrate
between hemispheres, and should a bird make the journey
while shedding sufficient active virus to infect birds in the
Western Hemisphere, newly infected birds would probably
die before being able to transport the virus from the entry
site. If spread of HPAI H5N1 to the New World occurs in
its current form (e.g., through domestic or pet bird trade or
smuggling), it should be readily detectable because of the
large number of dead native birds likely to result.
However, the virus is changing (19), and a modified H5N1
virus introduced into the Western Hemisphere could be
moved more readily by migratory waterfowl. If this event
were to occur, the virus should be amenable to control
through isolation and quarantine. If viral reassortment or
mutation occurs to produce a new virus that is readily
transmissible to humans, the role of birds in general and
migrants in particular may be moot because of the funda-
mentally different methods of infection favored by viruses
infecting humans and birds. Viruses infecting birds prefer-
entially attack the intestinal tract and are shed with the
feces; by contrast, human viruses mainly attack the respi-
ratory tract and are shed with respiratory effluvia. If HPAI
H5N1 were to gain wide circulation among migrants, it
might infect a bird already infected with another form of
Birds and Influenza H5N1 Virus, North America
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Figure 2. Map of known routes for nat-
ural interhemispheric bird movement:
route 1, migrants breeding in Alaska
and wintering in East Asia; route 2,
migrants breeding in East Asia and
wintering along the Pacific Coast of
North America; route 3, migrants
breeding in Iceland or northwestern
Europe and wintering along the
Atlantic Coast of North America; route
4, vagrants from West Africa carried by
tropical storm systems across the
Atlantic to eastern North America.avian influenza A and undergo reassortment to produce a
low-pathogenic form that is more readily spread.
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